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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RODNEY W. SMITH, 
Defendant/Appellant• 
Case No. 900214-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. 
section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (jurisdiction over criminal convictions less 
than first degree felonies). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court violate Mr. Smith's rights to 
confrontation and to present a defense, and misinterpret the rules 
of evidence, in excluding evidence concerning the criminal history 
of the State's primary witness? 
2. Did the trial court violate Mr. Smith's rights to 
confrontation and to present a defense, and misinterpret the rules 
of evidence, in excluding evidence impeaching key testimony of the 
State's primary witness? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's conclusions of law are entitled to no 
deference and are reversible if incorrect. Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and constitutional provisions are 
provided in the body of the brief or Appendix 1: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, section 1 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-404 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404 
Utah Rule of Evidence 607 
Utah Rule of Evidence 609 
Utah Rule of Evidence 801 
Utah Rule of Evidence 802 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The jurors convicted Mr. Smith of theft, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-404 (R. 30),1 
and the trial court sentenced him to a term of one to fifteen years 
in the Utah State Prison (R. 59). Private trial counsel filed a 
motion for a new trial (R. 64-65). The case was reassigned to 
appointed counsel (R. 66-67), and the trial court denied part of the 
1. The district court pleadings file will be referred to as 
"R." The transcript of the jury selection and pretrial motion will 
be referred to as "J.S." The transcript of the trial will be 
referred to as "T." The transcript of the hearing on the motion for 
a new trial held on December 18, 1989, will be referred to as 
"M.H." The transcript of the second hearing on the motion for a new 
trial held on March 5, 1990, will be referred to as "M.H.2" 
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motion and took part of it under advisement (R. 77). The court 
later denied the portion of the motion for a new trial previously 
taken under advisement (R. 84), and this appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 16, 1990, Mr. Smith and his friend, Scott 
Montoya, drove a small truck to Hot Water Products, where they 
loaded one of the hot tubs worth between $2,500 and $3,900 onto the 
truck (T. 30, 98-100). They then delivered the hot tub to the home 
of Scott Davidson (T. 101). 
It was Mr. Smith's defense to the theft charge2 that he 
lacked the requisite intent because Mr. Davidson had told Mr. Smith 
that Mr. Davidson had paid for the hot tub and had asked Mr. Smith 
to transport the hot tub to Mr. Davidson's home (T. 112). 
In contrast, Mr. Davidson testified for the State, 
indicating that Mr. Smith had approached Mr. Davidson about buying 
the hot tub from Mr. Smith (T. 49-53). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Rules of Evidence must be construed to facilitate 
Mr. Smith's constitutional rights to defend against criminal 
charges. 
2. Theft is defined by Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-404 as 
follows: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the property 
of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
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In excluding evidence concerning Mr. Davidson's criminal 
history, and in excluding evidence impeaching Mr. Davidson's 
testimony, the trial court misinterpreted the evidentiary rules and 
violated Mr. Smith's constitutional rights to defend himself. 
Because Mr. Davidson provided the key evidence in the 
State's case conflicting with Mr. Smith's defense, the trial court 
committed reversible error in witholding from the jurors 
Mr. Davidson's criminal history and other evidence impeaching his 
testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY ERRORS 
VIOLATED MR. SMITH'S RIGHTS TO PRESENT A DEFENSE 
AND REQUIRE REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION. 
As is discussed below, the trial court erred in excluding 
evidence of the criminal history of the State's key witness, 
Mr. Davidson, because the court erroneously believed that Utah Rules 
of Evidence 404(b) and 609(a) shield the State's witness from the 
presentation of the defense. The trial court also misinterpreted 
Utah Rule of Evidence 802 as excluding other evidence impeaching the 
State's witness. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT EXCLUDED EVIDENCE IMPEACHING THE STATE'S KEY 
WITNESS AND SUPPORTING MR. SMITH'S DEFENSE. 
1. THE TRIAL COURT EXCLUDED EVIDENCE OF THE STATE WITNESS' FELONY 
CONVICTIONS BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY BELIEVED THAT UTAH 
RULES OF EVIDENCE 609(a) AND 404(b) SHIELD THE STATE'S WITNESSES. 
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After the jury was selected, but prior to the commencement 
of the trial, the court conducted a hearing on various motions in 
limine. Pertinent transcript pages are contained in Appendix 2 to 
this brief. 
At this hearing, it was established that Mr. Davidson, the 
State's key witness who testified in contradiction to Mr. Smith's 
defense that Mr. Smith believed that he was merely transporting the 
hot tub, had two previous felony theft convictions and a conviction 
for possession of a falsified driver's license (J.S. 63). 
The court and prosecutor recognized the argument that Utah 
Rule of Evidence 609 does not apply to witnesses other than criminal 
defendants, and defense counsel argued that when a non-criminal 
defendant witness is impeached by prior crimes, there is no threat 
that the jury will convict the witness on the basis of prior 
convictions, as there is in cases where criminal defendants are 
impeached with evidence of prior convictions (J.S. 64-65). The 
prosecutor argued that all witnesses are to be treated as criminal 
defendants are under Rule 609, and argued that the prejudice 
stemming from Mr. Davidson's criminal history outweighed the 
probative value of the criminal history (J.S. 65-66). The trial 
court concluded that all witnesses' criminal histories are treated 
the same under Utah Rule of Evidence 609 (J.S. 67). 
The trial court indicated that defense counsel could 
inquire into Mr. Davidson's prior theft convictions if he could 
establish that they were crimes of dishonesty (J.S. 69). 
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Mr. Davidson testified about his convictions, indicating 
that the most recent felony theft conviction stemmed from his 
transportation of camper shells, as planned by other people 
directing the operation (J.S. 74-76). The court apparently then 
ruled that if Mr. Davidson testified that the theft of the hot tub 
was Mr. Smith's plan, defense counsel could impeach Mr. Davidson 
with evidence concerning the felony theft conviction involving the 
camper shell theft (J.S. 78). 
Prior to the testimony of Scott Davidson, the trial court 
excused the jurors, indicating that the court had decided to reverse 
the prior ruling allowing defense counsel to discuss Mr. Davidson's 
criminal history, and that the trial court would exclude the 
evidence because it was improper character evidence (T. 44-45). 
Defense counsel argued that the prior felony conviction of 
Mr. Davidson should be admissible to impeach his credibility, 
particularly because Mr. Davidson was a government witness rather 
than a criminal defendant (T. 45). 
The trial court discussed the issue further, concluding 
that Mr. Davidson's prior felony convictions were excluded by Utah 
Rule of Evidence 404(b) and Utah Rule of Evidence 609(a) (T. 45-47). 
2. THE TRIAL COURT EXCLUDED EVIDENCE SUPPORTING MR. SMITH'S DEFENSE 
AND IMPEACHING MR. DAVIDSON BECAUSE THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY BELIEVED 
THAT UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 802 EXCLUDES IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE AS 
HEARSAY. 
Mr. Davidson was allowed to testify that Mr. Smith 
contacted Mr. Davidson and offered to sell him the hot tub and later 
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delivered It to Mr. Davidson's house _ 48-53). Mr. Smith 
testified that Mr. Davidson had told Mr. Smith that Mr. Davidson had 
purchased the hot tub, and that Mr. Davidson had asked Mr. Smith to 
transport the hot tub from Hot Water Products to Mr. Davidson's 
house 1 1  1 1  8) . 
When defense counsel was examining Scott Montoya, who had 
helped Mr. Smith transport the hot tub to Mr. Davidson's house, the 
t' r i a I r u i i r t ' im in I nil in I M I II i mi ill*111 MI use cc f 
Mr. Montoya concerning Mr. Davidson's comments when the hot tub was 
delivered « defense counsel argued that Mi Davidson's 
interes- , ;: .? impeachment .e * :-*. :ur* ruled, 
"Credibility * exception the hearsay rule JL. MVJ^J 
Appenc . 3. 
„. THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL RELATING TO 
THESE RULINGS. 
After the jurors convicted Mr. smith of theft, defense 
counsel submitted a moti on for a new trial alleging, 
] , The Court committed reversible error in 
the following evidentiary rulings: 
a. By denying the defendant's attorney the 
right to inquire of the State's principal witness 
as to his prior felony convictions for theft and 
what role he played in planning the thefts which 
resulted in the felony convictions. 
b. By denying the defendant an opportunity 
to testify regarding his recollection of a 
conversation with Scott Davidson when Scott 
Davidson was allowed to testify as to his version 
of the same conversation for the State. 
(R. 64) . 
At the first hearing on the motion, after argument, the 
trial court denied the portion of the motion relating to 
Mr. Davidson's prior convictions (M.H. 7). Defense counsel and the 
prosecutor were uncertain about the facts underlying the portion of 
the motion relating to the hearsay objection, and the trial court 
took that portion of the motion under advisement pending preparation 
of a transcript (M.H. 5-7). The trial court allowed defense counsel 
to withdraw from the case, and the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association was appointed to represent Mr. Smith (M.H. 8). 
At the second hearing on the motion, the trial court 
indicated that there was nothing in the court's recollection that 
would support the motion for a new trial, and that the most 
efficient means of disposing of the case would be to deny the 
remainder of the motion for a new trial, which the court did 
(M.H.2 2-5). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS REFLECT A MISINTERPRETATION OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF EVIDENCE, WHICH RULES MUST BE CONSTRUED TO FACILITATE THE 
ACCUSED'S RIGHTS TO DEFEND AGAINST CRIMINAL CHARGES. 
Various state and federal constitutional provisions protect 
Mr. Smith's right to defend himself. Article I section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution provides, 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in 
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been 
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committed, and the r ight to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice 
put i n jeopardy for the same offense. 
The sixth amendment che United States Constitution protects the 
accused's :i: j gh !:: b :: • "itctt i nn «i ml i \ i ti i n," 1 fj" I si > ," I m u n ' I t, h e 
Utah Constitution and section 1 of I he fourteenth amendment to the 
United States Constitution guarantee the right to due process of 
] aw • 
These constitutional provisions have been construed * 
protecting the accused's right to present a a 
cllidcges . * explained .n Chambers v . M i s s i s s i p p i , 4 10 
U.S., 284 ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial 
to due process is, in essence, the right to a 
fair opportunity to defend against the State's 
accusations. The rights to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in 
one's own behalf have long been recognized as 
essential to due process. Mr. Justice Black, 
writing for the Court in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 
257, 273, 92 L.Ed. 682, 68 S.Ct. 299 (1948), 
identified these rights as among the minimum 
essentials of a fair trial. 
"A person's right to reasonable 
notice of a charge against him, and an 
opportunity to be heard in his defense -
~ right to his day in court • are basic 
in our system of jurisprudence; and 
these rights include, at a minimum, a 
right to examine the witnesses against 
him, to offer testimony, and to be 
represented by counsel." 
Chambers at 2S 4 
9 
The accused's constitutional rights to confrontation and to 
present a defense have been interpreted as permitting a defendant to 
inquire about the criminal history of witnesses testifying against 
the defendant. See Davis v. Alaska. 415 U.S. 308 (1974)(discussing 
how impeachment of State's witness with witness's criminal history 
is key to defendant's constitutional right to confrontation); 
State v. Patterson. 656 P.2d 438, 438-439 (Utah 1982)(same); 
State v. Conrov, 642 P.2d 873 (Ariz. App. 1982)(same). 
In several cases decided under the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
rather than under these constitutional provisions, Utah Courts have 
recognized the accused's right to defend against criminal charges. 
E.g. State v. Morrell. 803 P.2d 292, 298 and n.l (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)(declining to rule on constitutional grounds and relying on 
Utah Rule of Evidence 607, this Court characterized the defendant's 
impeachment of the credibility of the state's witness as a right); 
State v. Harrison. 152 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 24-25 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991)(declining to rule on constitutional grounds and relying on 
Utah Rules of Evidence, this Court explained that nevidence tending 
to disprove criminal intent should be admitted, even if it is not 
particularly strong."). 
As is discussed below, in ruling that Utah Rules of 
Evidence 609(a) and 404(b) shield the State's witness, the trial 
court misinterpreted the rules in a manner violating Mr. Smith's 
rights to defend against the criminal charge in this case. 
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1. UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 609(a) DOES NOT APPLY TO THE PROSECUTION 
WITNESSES' CONVICTIONS. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) is explicitly designed to 
(a) For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has 
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 
elicited from him or established by public record 
during cross-examination but only if the crime 
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year under the law under which he 
was convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant. or (2) involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. 
(emphasis added).3 The Utah Ii'ulhp was patterned after the original 
Federal Rule f Evidence (which recently : ^  re^ r* amended) , and 
fedei H. re 
in interpreting the Utah Rule. State v. Tucker 800 i .-i ,9. 322 
3. Other jurisdictions have chosen to omit the language of 
the rule explicitly protecting defendants. For example, in Arizona, 
Rule 609 reads, 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility 
of a witness, evidence that the witness has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 
elicited from the witness or established by 
public record, if the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect, and if the 
crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment 
in excess of one year under the law under which 
the witness was convicted or (2) involved 
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
Volume 17A of Arizona Code, Supplement 1990. As noted previou. 
in State v. Conroy, 642 P.2d 873 (Ariz. App. 1982), the court 
decided that a criminal defendant's right to confrontation requires 
that the defendant be allowed to impeach government witnesses with 
prior convictions. 
- 11 -
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) . 
Several federal courts have recognized that under the 
version of Rule 609 reflected in the Utah Rule, government witnesses 
are not protected from impeachment. For example, in United 
States v. Nevitt. 563 F.2d 406, (9th Cir. 1977)(per curiam), the 
court explained, 
The defendant may always use prior felony 
convictions of a prosecution witness. "Prejudice 
to the witness stemming from revelation of his 
past was rejected by Congress as a factor to be 
considered by the courts. Confrontation problems 
are thus avoided." The district court does not 
have discretion to weigh the probative value of a 
government witness' prior felony conviction 
against its prejudicial effect on the witness or 
the Governments case. Rule 609(a) limits the 
balancing test to determining prejudicial effect 
to the defendant. 
Id. at 408-409 (citations omitted). 
The legislative history of the federal rule protecting 
defendants from impeachment is discussed in United States v. Smith 
551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976), wherein the court summarized, 
The addition of the phrase "to the defendant" at 
the end of Rule 609(a)(1) reflects a deliberate 
choice to regulate impeachment by prior 
conviction only where the defendants interests 
might be damaged by admission of evidence of past 
crimes, and not where the prosecution might 
suffer, or where a non-defendant witness 
complains of possible loss of reputation in the 
community. 
Id. at 359 (emphasis by the court).4 
4. The Smith decision was characterized as the "leading 
federal case interpreting rule 609(a)" in State v. Bruce, 779 P. 2d 
646, 654 (Utah 1989), and has been cited repeatedly by Utah courts. 
E.g. State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 222 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Banner, 717 
P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986). 
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In Green v, Bock Laundry Machine Co,, U.S. 104 
i nil v i (J! i I m l I llii 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) after which the Utah Rule was 
patterned (which federal rule has since been amended) Ii reviewing 
the legislate ve history ol tlie " * " cnujt recognized that 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)( , is lesigned to encourage a 
r
 «
 m
 i mini I defMMi •- * ~esent a d e f e n s e . . g 
e admissibility riminal defendant's and defense witnesses7 
criminal convictions »Ed.2d at 564 and n,5 - bib, The Court 
iii ^.t:een expl i i» i: i ;i ] I ipfill / I i i t n e s s e s 
for the prosecution. 104 l»,Ed,2tJ at 564. 
The Advisory Committee Note to Utah Rule * Evidence 609 
^ : :)i:i: espoi ids M iii t l l Green n 
recognizing that the rule is designed to protect only criminal 
defendants from prior convictions impeachment. It states, "This 
rule s the federal rule, verbatim, and changes Utah .- aranting 
the court discretion in convictions not involving dishonesty 
fa] se statement " refuse t ::) admi t: the ev ii ience if It, would be 
prejudicial to the defendant. Current Utah law mandates the 
admission of such evidence." (emphasis added, Ltations of criminal 
r-iser ii ii 11; fed | , See also State v . Patterson,, i F11 "ml 4\nt 4 in -419 
(Utah 1982)(decided under old rules of evidence—defense counsel 
should have been allowed T inquire concerning the state's witness's 
constitutionally protected, because tr i. court made finding that 
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interests served by prior rule of evidence 45 (parallel to current 
403) called for exclusion of the convictions). 
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. section 78-24-9 provides, in 
part, "... a witness must answer as to the fact of his previous 
conviction of felony." In State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333 
(Utah 1986), the Court indicated that Utah Rule of Evidence 609 
supersedes section 78-24-9, insofar as the two provisions are 
inconsistent. Id. at 1333. In the context of impeachment of a 
government witness, there is no inconsistency between Rule 609 and 
section 78-24-9's requirement for admission of felony convictions. 
Even if Rule 609(a) were properly applied to the 
impeachment of the government's witness, the balancing test defined 
in State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) calls for the 
admission of Mr. Smith's felony convictions. The Banner 609(a)(1) 
balancing test requires the consideration of five factors: 
[1] The nature of the crime, as bearing on the 
character for veracity of the witness. 
[2] The recentness or remoteness of the prior 
conviction . . . 
[3] The similarity of the prior crime to the 
charged crime, insofar as a close resemblance may 
lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad 
person. 
[4] The importance of credibility issues in 
determining the truth in a prosecution tired 
without decisive nontestimonial evidence . . . 
[5] The importance of the accused's testimony, as 
perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions 
probative of the accused's character for 
veracity. . . 
Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334 (footnote omitted). 
Thefts have been recognized as reflecting poorly on the 
veracity of those who commit them. See e.g. United States v. Smith, 
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^51 F.2d 348 -64-365 (D. * , .-» thefts were committed 
« mi met imc See Utah ; Ldence 
609(b)(generally excluding convictions more than ten years o l d ) . 
There was no danger that Mr. Davidson's crimes were similar to the 
charges against • t o 
punish Mr. Smith. See Banner factor Because the case hinged on 
the credibility of the two opposing witnesses, Mr. Smith and Mr. 
Davidson M-T Davidson * s creel i Jb i I 1.1 y w. i ,s i mpi) i i a 111 - Banner 
factor Because Mr. Davidson was not "the accused, appears 
I hat * / to d^ uhe fifth Banner factor. 
In ruling that the State's witness, Mr. Davidson, was 
protected by U1 .^ Rule of Evidence 609(a *iw trial court 
riioii I si i iterprete .• I • - Smi thJ"s 
constitutional rights i present .* defense and confront the 
witnesses against him. 
2. UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(b) IS RELAXED WHEN APPLIED TO THE 
PROSECUTION WITNESSES' CONVICTIONS. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides, 
(b) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
r
 -• ' - j utah Rule of Evidence 404 
indicates that the rule follows the federal ru3 e. Utah Courts have 
found federax interpretations of the federal rule persuasive In 
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interpreting the Utah Rule. E.g. State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 
427 (Utah 1989)(referring to Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence in 
interpreting Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b)). 
Several federal courts interpreting the federal rule have 
allowed criminal defendants to present evidence of other witnesses' 
other crimes and bad acts. The court in United States v. 
Aboumoussallem, 726 F„2d 906 (2d Cir. 1984), explained the 
relaxation of Rule 404(b) when the defense presents the evidence, in 
the context of a case like the instant one, where the defendant 
wanted to present evidence that he had been duped into committing 
criminal acts. The Court stated: 
[W]e believe the standard of admissibility when a 
criminal defendant offers similar acts evidence 
as a shield need not be as restrictive as when a 
prosecutor uses such evidence as a sword. The 
prosecution, in the Anglo-American tradition, may 
not ordinarily offer evidence of a defendant's 
prior wrongdoing for the purpose of persuading 
the jury that the defendant has a propensity for 
crime and is therefore likely to have committed 
the offense for which he stands trial. As Dean 
Wigmore points out, the evidence "is 
objectionable not because it has no appreciable 
probative value but because it has too much." 
Presumably, the "too much" argument means that a 
guilty person, and, of far more serious concern, 
an innocent person, may be convicted primarily 
because of the jury's willingness to assume his 
present guilt from his prior misdeed. Wigmore 
also identifies objections based on the risk that 
the jury will convict because the defendant may 
not have been punished for his prior offenses and 
the injustice of requiring the defendant to 
defend against a series of accusations. . . . 
However, risks of prejudice are normally absent 
when the defendant offers similar acts evidence 
of a third party to prove some fact pertinent to 
the defense. 
Id. at 911 (citations omitted). 
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Another case like Aboumoussallem. and the instant case, 
I II llh/1 ! I y llllMjl . ! i l l f e i l S l 1 i l l 111 11 Hi .1 11 ti l t l i l l i | | I I h 1 l III 1 111 II i I I * III II Ikl II l I W llllllW e 
government's witness is United States v. Cohen, 888 F.2d ' ,nlth 
Ci r 1 989) The court in Cohen recognized that when the defense 
seeks l\u presen t: Uie av i deuce
 9 Unhi 4IU ("b) is leJdxi^JI, - " '""«".. 
The Cohen court noted that the United States Supreme Court 
Huddleston _v United States, 4 8 5 u. o. oo Q * ' *• . 1 4 * t > q 8 b; , 
has summarized the legislative history r; b) as t . ^HWR: 
"Congress was not nearly so concerned with the 
potential prejudicial effect of Rule 404(b) 
evidence as it was with ensuring that 
restrictions would not be placed on the admission 
of such evidence." 108 S.Ct. at 1501. When the 
defendant offers similar acts evidence of a 
witness to prove a fact pertinent to the defense, 
the normal risk of prejudice is absent. 
Id. at 777. 
U t a h llliiw i" (j in [ I u i 1 i w i l I in I I nil " ".'iiiiMW i n S t a t e v Shickles, 
7 60 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988), i i i discussing the admission of crimes and 
acts under Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b) and ; - e court 
i m p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i s e d I h»i! I lu< pi e j ud.i i v I l> *;M,II in I In i s 
context is the possibility that the jurors will ;,e motivated tc 
convict the defendant because of the defendant's crimes and bad 
acts, rather than because o * :ie evidence pertinent t, J the charges: 
In deciding whether the danger of unfair 
prejudice and the like substantially outweighs 
the incremental probative value , a variety of 
matters must be considered, including the 
strength of the evidence as to the commission of 
the other crime, the similarities between the 
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed 
between the crimes, the need for the evidence, 
the efficacy of alternative proof and the degree 
to which the evidence probably will rouse the 
jury to overmastering hostility. 
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Id. at 295-296 (emphasis added). 
Even if Rule 404(b) were properly strictly applied to the 
acts and crimes of a witness for the prosecution, it would not 
exclude Mr. Davidson's crime. Defense counsel sought to present 
evidence of Mr. Davidson's felony theft conviction concerning the 
camper shells for the purpose of showing that in following the plans 
of others in that criminal enterprise, Mr. Davidson had learned how 
to plan a crime to be committed by others. Defense counsel was 
trying to show Mr. Davidson's knowledge and was not merely trying to 
show that he was acting in conformity with his past actions. The 
previous convictions were also necessary for impeachment purposes. 
See Point B.l of this brief. Hence, Rule 404(b) would not have 
barred this evidence. See United States v. Cohen, supra (under 
Federal Rule 404(b), trial court committed reversible error in 
excluding defense evidence concerning the government witness' 
criminal know how); State v. Bates. 784 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Utah 
1989)("since the evidence of 'prior bad acts' of defendant was not 
offered to prove his character or show 'that he acted in conformity 
therewith,' the trial court did not err in denying defendant's 
motion for a mistrial."). 
In ruling that the State witness' prior conviction was 
excluded by Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b), the trial court 
misinterpreted that rule of evidence, and violated Mr. Smith's 
constitutional rights to present a defense and confront the 
witnesses against him. 
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3. UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 802 DOES NOT EXCLUDE EVIDENCE IMPEACHING 
THE TESTIMONY OF MR. DAVIDSON. 
As noted previously, the trial court excluded Mr. Montoya's 
version of Mr. Davidson's comments upon the arrival of the hot tub 
at the Davidson residence because "credibility is not an exception 
to the hearsay rule." (T. 102). 
Utah Rule of Evidence 802 is the general rule excluding 
hearsay evidence. The rule did not bar the presentation of 
Mr. Davidson's comments upon the arrival of the hot tub, as 
presented through Mr. Montoya, because Mr. Davidson's comments were 
presented to impeach Mr. Davidson's testimony, rather than to "prove 
the truth of the matter asserted." Under Utah Rule of Evidence 
801(c), just quoted, Mr. Davidson's comments fell outside the 
definition of hearsay. See State v. Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635, 636 
(Utah 1982)(when statement is for impeachment purposes, it falls 
outside the definition of hearsay; particularly when person quoting 
declarant of impeachment statement is subject to examination, it 
should be admitted). 
Once again, the trial court's evidentiary error had the 
effect of violating Mr. Smith's right to defend against the criminal 
charge and to confront the State's witness. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL ERRORS WERE PREJUDICIAL AND REQUIRE A NEW 
TRIAL. 
Because the trial court's rulings were based on erroneous 
views of the law, they constitute abuses of discretion. Gaw v. 
State of Utah, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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Because the trial court's errors violated Mr. Smith's rights to 
defend against the criminal charge, they are subject to reversal 
unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Patterson. 656 
P.2d 438, 438-439 (Utah 1982). Particularly when the errors are 
viewed cumulatively, see State v. Johnson. 784 P.2d 1135, 1146 (Utah 
1989)(recognizing cumulative error), they call for reversal of 
Mr. Smith's conviction. 
The trial court's rulings shielding Mr. Davidson from 
impeachment cannot be considered harmless, much less harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. This case turns on the conflicting testimony of 
two witnesses: Mr. Smith, who testified that he did not know that 
the hot tub was stolen, but was transporting the hot tub under Mr. 
Davidson's direction; and Mr. Davidson, who testified that the 
entire arrangement was initiated by Mr. Smith. 
Mr. Smith's testimony that he took the hot tub with an 
innocent state of mind is supported by the fact that the hot tub was 
taken from a lot that is plainly visible from the freeway when it 
was light outside (T. 19, 99). When Mr. Smith borrowed the truck 
for the hot tub transportation, he told the truck owners he was 
going to transport a hot tub that a friend had purchased (T. 85). 
Scott Montoya, who helped Mr. Smith retrieve the hot tub, and who 
was also charged in this case, indicated that Mr. Smith had asked 
him to assist in transporting a friend's hot tub (T. 98). While 
Mr. Davidson testified that he paid Mr. Smith $200 upon the arrival 
of the hot tub at the Davidson residence (T. 53), Scott Montoya 
testified that he did not see any such transaction (T. 102). 
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If the jurors had known about Mr. Davidson's criminal 
history and had been allowed to hear Mr. Montoya's version of what 
Mr. Davidson said when the hot tub arrived, the jurors may have 
believed Mr. Smith's defense that Mr. Davidson duped Mr. Smith into 
transporting the hot tub. In these circumstances, the trial court's 
erroneous rulings excluding evidence of Mr. Davidson's criminal 
history and excluding evidence impeaching his testimony must be 
corrected in a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Mr. Smith's conviction and order 
the trial court to preside over a new trial in which Mr. Smith is 
allowed to defend against the criminal charge to the full extent 
permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence and mandated by the Utah and 
United States Constitutions. /U 
Respectfully submitted this n day of March, 
1991. 
^Ll Z ABETSTHO tERbOK 
A'tto^ rney fc^ij Mr. Smith 
- 21 -
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Elizabeth Holbrook, hereby certify that eight copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals and 
that four copies of the foregoing will be delivered to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, 
this L 
!fc 
^ 
day of March, 1991. 
EKLZABETH \0-i HOLBROOK 
DELIVERED by 
of March, 1991. 
this day 
- 22 -
APPENDIX 1 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife 
shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall 
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Amendment VI to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides in 
pertinent part: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-404 provides;: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the property of 
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404 provides: 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to 
prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence 
of a person7s character or a trait of his character 
is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he 
acted in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence 
of a pertinent trait of his character offered 
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of 
a pertinent trait of character of the victim 
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the 
prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of 
a character trait of peacefulness of the 
victim offered by the prosecution in a 
homicide case to rebut evidence that the 
victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence 
of the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607/608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show 
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 607 provides: 
Rule 607. Who may impeach. 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked 
by any party, including the party calling him. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 609 provides in pertinent part: 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of 
crime• 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence 
that he has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if elicited from him or established by 
public record during cross-examination but only if 
the crime (1) was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law 
under which he was convicted, and the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting 
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to 
the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 801 provides in pertinent part: 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral 
or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a 
person, if it is intended by him as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person 
who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, 
other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A 
statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The 
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the trial or hearing and is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement and the statement is 
(A) inconsistent with his testimony or the 
witness denies having made the statement or 
has forgotten, or (B) consistent with his 
testimony and is offered to rebut an express 
or implied charge against him of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive, 
or (C) one of identification of a person made 
after perceiving him; or 
Utah Rule of Evidence 802 provides: 
Rule 802. Hearsay rule. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law 
or by these rules. 
APPENDIX 2 
DISCUSSION OF MR. DAVIDSON'S CRIMINAL HISTORY 
1 THE COURT: It does not fit within what you 
2 call the classic intent of 803. However, within the 
3 literal language, and not meaning to be always a 
4 literalist, I think on this particular occasion it will 
5 be admitted, if otherwise proper, but it will not be 
6 excluded as hearsay, 
7 MR. VAN SCIVER: The other issue is who can I 
8 impeach and why? 
9 THE COURT: All right. I think I can shorten 
10 this. As I understand it, a witness for the prosecution 
11 has a prior record concerning two thefts and a false — 
12 MR. VAN SCIVER: — application for a driver's 
13 license. 
14 THE COURT: That's right. 
15 MR. SKORDAS: Having in his possession a 
16 falsified driver's license. 
17 MR. VAN SCIVER: Whatever. 
18 THE COURT: Right. 
19 MR. SKORDAS: And the thefts were both 
20 felonies. 
21 THE COURT: All right. The question is whether 
22 those are admissible under 609 as reflecting upon 
23 credibility. Mr. Van Solver's position is that the 
24 rulings by the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 
25 prohibiting that type of stuff, except in very limited 
circumstances with respect to defendants charged in 
criminal cases, does not apply when the person is not a 
defendant charged in a criminal case. And specifically 
here we're talking about Mr. Davidson. 
MR. SKORDAS: Correct. 
THE COURT: Do you have any cases in support of 
the proposition that those rulings are applicable to the 
8 I State but not to a defendant? 
9 MR. VAN SCIVER: I think you're splitting the 
10 issue by thinking that's the most recent thing that has 
11 come down to the court limiting the inquiry regarding the 
12 defendant should be applied equally. And perhaps that's 
13 a concern to some people, but I have always thought if 
14 you call somebody as a witness you vouch for their — at 
15 least their credibility. You're entitled to attack it in 
16 any appropriate fashion consistent with the rules. But 
17 when you shift to the criminal defendant, probably the 
18 most important thing to know is if he's got any priors, 
19 then he must have done this. 
20 They are there, the balance, the instruction 
21 between prejudice, determining harm, and probative value. 
22 And courts are lining up strongly on the proposition that 
23 you rule on the case that's before you and not your 
24 history. But that's not true when applied to a witness. 
25 J It doesn't mean you have to reject any witness, it's just 
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one of those things to take into account in making a 
determination of how much weight to put into his 
testimony, and it seems to me that it's appropriate that 
he be entitled to that. 
We're blaming Davidson for the whole caper and 
it's important for this jury to know that he has two 
prior felony convictions. 
THE COUPT: All right. Mr. Skordas. 
MR. SKORDAS: Unfortunately, your Honor, I was 
unable to find any case law. We reviewed the last 10 or 
12 cases on this issue and each of those defendants with 
a prior conviction of the defendant. And the only case 
that I found that even approached the idea of the 
defendant is a witness in an old 1973 case — I guess 
it's not that old — but, basically, it indicates that a 
witness must answer to the fact of his prior convictions 
of felonies, and that a criminal in a criminal case may 
be cross-examined by counsel for the State the same as 
any other witness, which is actually the sort of a flip 
side of what we're arguing here. And that is they are 
saying that the defendant is on the same scale as any 
other witness. 
And what I'm arguing is that the witness is on 
the same standard as the defendant with respect to his 
prior convictions. I think the Court also needs to make 
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a finding that probative value of these prior convictions 
outweighs their prejudicial content, not that it's just 
on the prior convictions but that they are probative and 
the purpose of these convictions is to show that he — I 
assume it is — that he committed this theft on this 
occasion. 
The best way to prove that a most probative 
issue of that is his plea of guilty to this very issue. 
The only thing that is added by the prior felony 
convictions is prejudice, the jury against Mr. Davidson. 
THE COURT: You don't have any problem with Mr. 
Van Sciver making inquiry into the guilty plea in Mr. 
Davidson's — 
MR. SKORDAS: On this matter? 
THE COURT: — case involving this hot tub? 
MR. SKORDAS: No, I don't have any problem with 
that. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: Let me — 
THE COURT: The rules are not premised on 
anyone vouching for the credibility of witnesses they 
call. In fact, the rules, in Section 600 specifically 
indicate that one can challenge the credibility of a 
witness that even that party calls. 
I think that differs a little bit by the 
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1 criminal context when you're talking about prosecution, 
2 because I think the prosecution must vouch for the 
3 credibility of the witnesses it calls on the respective 
4 matter they intend to call them, and that is, in this 
5 case Mr. Davidson's testimony as to the involvement of 
6 Mr. Smith. As to all other matters, I don't think they 
7 have to vouch for their credibility. 
8 In reading this Supreme Court case, the most 
9 recent one, and the previous cases of the Court of 
10 Appeals that limited the inquiry into the prior record of 
11 a defendant. They focused on the credibility issue, and 
12 that the type of thing that can be brought out must 
13 relate to one's propensity for telling the truth rather 
14 than one's propensity for committing crime, even if they 
15 may be crimes of stealth. 
16 For that reason, I believe that they would 
17 treat all witnesses the same under Rule 609, and in 
18 determining their probative versus their inflammatory 
19 nature under 402. 
20 MR. VAN SCIVER: Let me say this: Anything 
21 prior to '83 would be inappropriate. I'll take half of 
22 his cases that happen, which permits me to cite anything 
23 before '83, certainly everything since then, and we're 
24 supposed to be starting anew. 
25 And the rules encourage a fresh interpretation. 
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I mean, they say so. And when he's arguing that I can't 
attack his witness unless you reason that I can put on 
some evidence of the propensity to commit the crime, 
well, that's like the dichotomy between impeachment and 
reasonable doubt. And it seems to me that I'm entitled 
to attack the credibility of this witness, as he would 
be, consistent with the rules. And I think the only 
possible interpretation is I'm entitled, because it 
relates to the probability that he masterminded this 
operation, which is our belief, and also that the fact 
that he has been convicted of two prior felonies of theft 
lead to the probability that he in fact masterminded it. 
I think all of that is subject to relevant 
inquiry. And I think I'm entitled to ask those 
questions. 
THE COURT: You believe you're entitled to have 
the full extent of cross-examination of Mr. Davidson to 
show generally that he's not a credible witness, and in 
doing so, you would be limited in terms of prior bad acts 
to those that reflect upon his honesty and integrity in 
testimonial context, so you'll be limited in that way by 
the recent rulings of the Utah Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeals. But as to examining him concerning his 
propensity for masterminding something like that, I 
believe you're entitled to further examine him if you can 
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show in those prior circumstances that he was in fact the 
mastermind, limited to that issue. I think you are 
entitled to make that inquiry. 
Now, with that ruling in mind, I think we need 
to have Mr. Davidson here so that you can make your 
inquiry of him under oath outside the hearing of the jury 
to determine whether or not those three prior convictions 
might have involved false statement, and we know one did. 
And I'll allow that. But inquiry as to the two thefts, 
whether they involved something more than your run-of-
the-mill theft, so you'll determine whether or not 
there's evidence you can present by him through the jury 
that he was the mastermind of either one of those thefts, 
and/or whether either of those thefts involved such 
conduct that it would relate to his ability to testify 
truthfully. 
So somehow it's theft by deception, things like 
that, then it would be allowed in. Do we have Mr. 
Davidson available? And only, Mr. Van Sciver, if you 
have evidence independent of Mr. Davidson on those 
matters, you will be allowed to present that too. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: Do what? 
THE COURT: If you had evidence independent of 
Mr. Davidson's own testimony on those matters, you can 
put that in too. 
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Mr. Davidson, would you step forward and be 
sworn? 
SCOTT T. DAVIDSON. 
called as a witness by the defendant, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified upon his oath as 
follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. VAN SCIVER: 
Q. You are Scott T. Davidson; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you're the defendant in Criminal No. 89-
1228; is that correct? 
A. Yes, I think so. 
Q. In that matter, you pled guilty to what? 
MR. SKORDAS: It would have been receiving 
stolen property, a Class A misdemeanor. 
THE COURT: Receiving stolen property? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Van Sciver, you may 
inquire of Mr. Davidson concerning the two thefts. The 
other matter, if you want to, too, the driver's license 
matter. 
Q. (By Mr. Van Sciver) About the driver's 
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license, as I recall, you told us that you had filled out 
an application for a driver's license. 
A. 
Q. 
No, I hadn't filled out an application for one. 
How is it that this driver's license charge 
came against you? 
A. 
altered 
from him 
Q. 
Person I knew was making driver's licenses with 
birth dates on them. And I just acquired one 
• 1 
So you possessed a card wherein you 
intentionally told something that was not true? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, basically. 
How long ago was that? 
About eight years ago. 
How old are you? 
26. 
It occurred when you were 18? 
Right around there. 
Then you have been convicted of two felonies 
since then? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
They're both theft crimes? 
Yes. 
And they are what years? 
'86, '85, '84, somewhere around in there. 
Are the facts reasonably fresh in your mind? 
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A. 
Q. 
facts of 
A. 
Q. 
Pretty much. 
You pled to a felony three years ago, and the 
each — 
Well, the facts really aren't, but, yes. 
The facts really aren't? The judge wants to 
know about those cases. Are you able to tell us about 
those? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, to the best of my knowledge, sure. 
Take the oldest one, '85. 
Okay. 
Tell us what happened. 
I think it was a burglary and it involved drugs 
and I had to repay some money, and — 
Davidson. 
THE COURT: You need to keep your voice up, Mr. 
» 1 
THE WITNESS: Oh. And I was put in a position 
where I needed to come up with a few things for some 
people, and I committed a burglary. 
Q. 
somebody 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
that you 
(By Mr. Van Sciver) Okay. So you owed 
some money? 
Yes. 
Did you tell them you would pay them back? 
Yes. Basically, I didn't have a choice. 
Okay. And did you make at least — how is it 
came to owe the money? 
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A, It was over drugs. 
Q. All right. Did you give them a deadline? I 
mean, was there some false things you said to this 
person? 
A. No. 
Q. Well, then, why did you have to go commit a 
burglary? 
A. Well, it's a complicated story, really. I got 
ripped off on some things that weren't mine, and I was 
held responsible for them. So they wanted a computer. 
Q. They wanted what? 
A. A computer. And they gave me a list of things 
they wanted, to compensate for that. 
Q. Okay. So you went out and filled the list for 
them? 
A. Basically, yes. 
Q. Okay. And the next one — so it's out and out 
burglary theft? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And there's no false statements that you're 
aware of other than, perhaps, your participation was 
wrong? 
A. Yes, but no false statement, no. 
Q. You were apparently placed on probation. 
A. Yes, I was. 
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Q. And was that ever revoked? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. Why was that? 
A. Because of a theft* 
Q. Another theft? 
A. Yes. Over a carpenter shop. 
Q. ¥ou made a bunch of implicit promises in the 
probation agreement which you signed in writing. 
A. Yes. Yes, basically, probation agreement. 
Q. And I suppose, by your actions, you lied? 
A. No, I just didn't live up to the agreement that 
I had. 
Q. When you signed it, you committed the next 
felony in that you promised not to violate the law? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So by your actions, you lied. 
A. Technically, I guess. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: Well, your Honor, I don't see 
where a violation of probation is a crime involving 
dishonesty. I don't know that in either case it's going 
to get any better than that sort of fabrication. 
Q. Run us quickly through the facts in number 
two. 
A. I got involved with some people that were 
taking camper shells, and I got involved with them and I 
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1 took one myself with them. 
2 J Q. Were there some parallels in that one and in 
3 this one? 
4 A. I don't understand what you mean. 
5 Q. Who planned the taking of those? 
6 I A. Another guy did. 
7 Q. What role did you play? 
8 A. Mainly labor. 
9 Q. What? 
10 A. Just labor. 
11 Q* You got caught with the camper shell? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 THE COURT: What about the burglary? Who 
14 planned the burglary? 
15 THE WITNESS: Well, the other guys gave me the 
16 information on it, and the rest of it was up to me. 
17 THE COURT: They gave you the information as to 
18 the — 
19 THE WITNESS: This place would have what they 
20 wanted. 
21 THE COURT: Then they gave you a grocery list 
22 and you were to go there and get it? 
23 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
24 Q. (By Mr. Van Sciver) In terms of setting the 
25 J time, determining when you were going to do it, who 
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planned that out? 
A. I guess I did. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: I think I got that one. 
THE COURT: Do you have any other testimony you 
want to get from this gentleman? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: No. 
THE COURT: Mr. Skordas, do you have some 
8 I cross? 
9 MR. SKORDAS: No. 
10 THE COURT: You may step down, Mr. Davidson. 
11 We'll be recalling you, so stick around. 
12 It seems to me the most that's been established 
13 through the testimony is that Mr. Skordas should feel 
14 free to address thisf that as to the burglary may be a 
15 question of fact for the jury as to who planned it, and 
16 whether or not that reflects upon who did what in this 
17 case, or as to Mr. Davidson's credibility, if there is 
18 any evidence from him that Mr. Smith planned this. 
19 So with that in mind, do you want to react to 
20 that, Mr. Skordas? 
21 MR. SKORDAS: I'm not sure where we are. 
22 THE COURT: Right now, unless you persuade me 
23 otherwise, I'll allow Mr. Van Sciver to inquire only as 
24 follows: 
25 Concerning the criminal record of Mr. Davidson. 
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He can search on inquiry in front of the jury about the 
driver's license matter, and he can inquire about the 
burglary, for the purpose of probing whether or not Mr. 
Davidson was a planner and a leader on that. 
MR. SKORDAS: So essentially 404(b) evidence, 
and we have drifted from 609, character evidence, to 
proof of conduct. And, of course, once he asks him about 
the other burglary, that's it. If Davidson alleged he 
wasn't the head person in that, then the damage is done. 
THE COURT: Do you folks expect Mr. Davidson to 
say — 
MR. VAN SCIVER: It's structured as "you have 
expressed concern.11 He says it's Smith's deal. Smith 
says, "No, I was following Davidson's orders." 
MR. SKORDAS: Exactly right. Davidson is going 
to testify that Smith sold him a hot tub for $500, which 
proved to be hot. 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Skordas does raise 
another interesting limitation, and that is character 
reference. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: That's why you're entitled to 
impeachment, because it's character reference as to 
truthfulness. I mean, I would be much more inclined to 
put my belief in the word of someone who had not been 
convicted of a felony. That's exactly why you get to do 
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1 that, for impeachment. Truth is the character trait that 
2 you have. 
3 THE COURT: I think my ruling will remain the 
4 same, that he can inquire into the burglary. Under both 
5 609 — 
6 1 MR. SKORDAS: He wasn't even convicted of a 
7 burglary. 
8 THE COURT: But we're talking about a 404, with 
9 other crimes, wrongs, or acts, to show such things as 
10 motive, opportunity, and intent, preparation, plan, 
H knowledge, identity, or maybe most important in this 
12 case, absence of mistake or accident. 
13 All right. Do we know where we're going? 
14 MR. VAN SCIVER: I think. I'm sure you can 
15 remind us if we stray. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Is the ruling clear 
17 enough for you, Mr. Skordas? 
18 MR. SKORDAS: Yes. 
19 THE COURT: Are we ready to bring the jury in? 
20 Let's do so. I have gone through the jury instructions 
21 proposed by Mr. Skordas, have taken out 12-A, suggesting 
22 the defendant will not testify, and substituting my 
23 reasonable doubt instruction for that of Mr. Skordas'. I 
24 have otherwise left them the same. Do you have any 
25 problems with the jury instructions, of that format? 
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1 your testimony. You may be excused, if you would like. 
2 Who is your next witness? 
3 MR. SKORDAS: We'll call Scott Davidson. 
4 THE COURT: All right. The court reporter has 
5 been at it for an hour and a half. I realize the jury has 
6 only been at it for an hour. I need to talk to counsel 
7 on the record about something also. So why don't we see 
8 if we can take a ten-minute break right now. Remember the 
9 admonition of the Court, do not discuss this matter with 
10 anyone, including among yourselves, do not form or express 
11 any opinions and conclusions. We'll see you in about ten 
12 minutes. 
13 [Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.] 
14 THE COURT: The record should indicate that 
15 the jury is now departed. The defendant and his counsel 
16 are still present, along with the State. 
17 I have been thinking about this ruling, and 
18 the more I think about it, the more it appears to me that 
19 you're talking about character evidence of Mr. Davidson. 
20 The character evidence is admissible only in certain ways, 
21 and specific instances of character should be shown that 
22 on character was in conformity with the actions at 
23 the time, and the question is generally not admissible. 
24 So I'm thinking about changing my ruling on that. 
25 MR. VAN SCIVER: You don't want to ever do that, 
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1 THE COURT: I looked over the rules, and it 
2 appears to me if you want character evidence, we're talking 
3 about the character of Mr, Davidson. It's got to come in 
4 in certain ways. And the disclaimed way is proving conformitjy 
5 of his character with a particular incident on the date 
6 in question. I don't think you can do it. 
^ MR. VAN SCIVER: Well, all I can do is say that -j 
8 and I believe this to be a sound statement of the law — 
9 if you call somebody as a witness, you vouch for their 
10 credibility, that it follows that someone who is a convicted 
11 felon or at least assignment of responsibility is his, that 
12 someone who has been convicted of a felony is less credible. 
13 And I think that is the rule, and that is you're entitled 
14 to inquire of someone who is a witness offered by the 
15 government. 
16 THE COURT: But when the government and the 
17 Supreme Court have ruled on these cases, they have ruled 
18 under Rule 609. They have not ruled under Rule 404, and 
19 they have addressed that very thing on credibility with 
20 respect to a defendant, and have addressed it only in context] 
21 of credibility and not in the context of Rule 404, prejudice. 
22 if they had addressed it in the context of 
23 Rule 404, then I would say that there may be a different 
24 standard applicable to known defendant witnesses, because 
25 thev have said the conviction of a crime does not reflect 
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1 generally upon credibility. 
2 MR. VAN SCIVER: If what I have interpreted, 
3 and I thought this was your ruling, Crime No. 1 in '85 is 
4 out, you couldn't inquire because it wasn't anything the 
5 finder of fact could determine from that and it would address! 
6 itself to just trying to discredit him. But that the other 
7 one, particularly if he contends that it's Smith's idea, 
8 can be inquired into. 
9 THE COURT: That was my original ruling. What 
10 I'm saying now, and that ruling was independent of credibility, 
11 it was really directed to character. 
12 MR. VAN SCIVER: I think not. The latter, you 
13 almost have to wait and see what his answers are. 
14 THE COURT: Well, if his answers are sufficient 
15 that you can challenge his credibility because he testified 
16 falsely on credibility, absolutely you can go after him on 
17 credibility. But I don't think you can inquire about his 
18 propensity to be a leader in ill-gotten goods, because that 
19 was character evidence. 
20 MR. VAN SCIVER: All right, 
21 THE COURT: My ruling is changed in that you 
22 cannot inquire concerning the burglary incident for the 
23 purpose of showing that he's a leader. 
24 MR. VAN SCIVER: Well, I just, you know, that's 
25 fine. If we leave out the word leader,. I donft know where 
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1 we'll go, and all I'm saying to you, thanks for the direction), 
2 but I think maybe it's a little premature to decide where 
3 I need to stop, 
4 THE COURT: Well --• 
5 MR. VAN SCIVER: I'm not going to go over the 
6 line. 
7 THE COURT: I'm saying you're not going to be 
8 able to get into the proposition on the burglary that he's 
9 a leader, that leaves only the possibility of credibility. 
10 And I heard nothing from his testimony that would indicate 
11 that that burglary was of such a nature that it involved 
12 false statements indicating that his testimonial character 
13 is subject to challenge. And, therefore, I have nothing 
14 in front of me right now to indicate that it would be appropriate 
15 for you to bring out his conviction on the burglary on the 
16 theft. 
17 MR. VAN SCIVER: Okay. Okay. 
18 THE COURT: All right. So we're left only with 
19 the — 
20 MR. VAN SCIVER: False driver's license. 
21 THE COURT: Right. And whether or not — how 
22 his deal in this case reflects upon his credibility. 
23 MR. VAN SCIVER: Right. All right. 
24 THE COURT: We'll take a short recess. 
25 [Whereupon, court was in recess at 2:50 p.m.] 
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APPENDIX 3 
TRIAL COURT'S HEARSAY RULING CONCERNING MR. MONTOYA'S 
QUOTATION OF MR. DAVIDSON 
1 Q. And were there any markings on that tub that 
2 you can recall? 
3 k There was a tag on it, a sold tag. That was 
4 all. Other than just the hot tub itself. 
5 Q. Did you see any signs of any kind on the fence? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. There wasn't anything on the fence? All right. 
8 Where did you go from there? 
9 I A. We drove out to the street which was — the 
10 south I'm not sure, then headed east toward State Street 
11 and got to State Street and headed north towards Murray 
12 High School. 
13 Q. All right. What was to be your destination? 
14 k We had to stop and make a phone call because 
15 Rodney didn't have the address to Scott's house. So he 
16 met us behind Murray High School and we followed him to 
17 his house from there. 
18 Q. What occurred when you got to Mr. Davidson's 
19 house? 
20 k I backed the truck to the side of his house 
21 and we unloaded it, and that was it. Put it in the back 
22 of his house, you know, behind the house. 
23 Q. Were you present during any conversations between 
24 Mr. Smith and Mr. Davidson? 
25 A. I was there the whole time, yes. 
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ft 
k 
What was discussed between you? 
The only conversation — 
MR. SKORDAS: I object. That was hearsay. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: Well, I suppose it could be 
an exception to hearsay, at least as to credibility, because 
it would be offered, arguably, against the interest of 
both declarants. 
that way. 
THE COURT: Going on what was said? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: Yes. 
MR. SKORDAS: Well, it's not going to come out 
THE COURT: All right. Credibility is not an 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
ft 
A. 
ft 
between the 
k 
ft 
k 
there maybe 
ft 
yard where 
k 
MR. VAN SCIVER: No, but being offered against — 
Was there a conversation that you overheard? 
Yes. 
All right. Did you see anything exchange hands 
two gentlemen? 
No. 
When did you leave Mr. Davidson's premises? 
I don't know the exact time. We were probably 
15 minutes. 
And, again, the time that you arrived at the 
the tub was was when? 
I would say about quarter to 6:00. In that 
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